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Abstract
Chinese economic presence in Europe is primarily discussed as a security threat with 
its impact on sustainability remaining a rather marginal issue. This article investigates 
the repercussions of Chinese capital’s surge in Europe for environmental protection 
and analyses the reasons behind its poor performance. We examine five key Chinese 
projects in Southeast Europe, a sub- region that includes countries with different forms 
of association with European institutions and with varying levels of development and 
state capacity. We find that the negative environmental impact of these projects cannot 
be attributed to the commonly held perception of the Chinese as inherently “bad” 
investors and of host states as “weak” and dependent. Rather, we identify a synergy 
of failures between investors, host states and regional institutions that results in poor 
regulation and compliance. This finding calls for the inclusion of sustainability in foreign 
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Introduction
Chinese outward capital has attracted considerable attention worldwide, triggering both 
positive and negative reactions. While some countries, especially developing and crisis- 
stricken European Union (EU) nations, view it as an important new source of invest-
ment, others fear that it is centrally controlled and promotes China’s aggressive foreign 
policy agenda. Regarding Southeast Europe (SEE), over the last five years, European 
policy makers, think tanks, consultants and journalists have exhibited rather alarmist 
attitudes towards expanding Chinese economic activity and the political leverage this 
might entail in a region traditionally seen as Europe’s “soft underbelly.” This ongoing, 
and largely inconclusive, debate has concentrated on political and security concerns 
about China’s actual or potential influence over current and aspiring EU member- states 
and its impact on EU cohesion (Benner et al., 2018; Casarini, 2015; Godement and 
Vasselier, 2017; Hellström, 2016; Karásková et al., 2018; Meunier, 2014; Pavlićević, 
2018; Rogelja and Tsimonis, 2020; Vangeli, 2017; van Pinxteren, 2017). Threat percep-
tions associated with Chinese capital have flourished and fuelled policy responses. 
Characteristically, the EU foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanism was 
created in 2019 to safeguard the Union against the security or public order threats of 
foreign investment, primarily originating from China. Both the debate and the policy 
responses have widely neglected areas of direct concern for European citizens and soci-
eties, including labour practices, environmental protection and the impact of Chinese 
capital on local economies (with notable exceptions like Drahokoupil, 2017 and Neilson, 
2019 on labour).
Another stream of the literature is increasingly concerned with the model of develop-
ment that Chinese capital promotes and the corresponding challenges for Western liberal 
norms and regulatory standards (Adisu et al., 2010; Armony and Strauss, 2012; Baah and 
Jauch, 2009; Lee, 2018; Trofimov, 2007). The Chinese president’s 2017 assertion that 
China offers a “new option” for developing countries (Xi, 2017) has further intensified 
this debate, raising fear and criticism of the corporate governance and social responsibil-
ity standards of Chinese companies (Economy, 2019). This literature, however, focuses 
predominantly on regions of the Global South characterised by underdevelopment and 
weak institutional capacity, where Western and other developing country actors have a 
long track record of exploitative activities and unethical corporate practices (Duanmu, 
2014; Elliott and Freeman, 2004; Moran, 2002). As a result, it is often not analytically 
possible to distinguish the impact of Chinese capital from the effect of structural 
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limitations emanating from neoliberal reform programmes imposed by Western lenders 
or weak developmental bureaucracies and corruption.
The present article engages directly with the debate on regulatory standards and prac-
tices by examining a key area of concern about the Chinese developmental model, 
namely environmental protection. It concentrates on Southeast Europe, an integral part 
of China’s new “Silk Road.” This region combines EU countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Greece, Romania and Slovenia), where environmental protection is regulated according 
to EU legislation, and aspiring members (including Albania, Bosnia- Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia), where national regulation could be more amena-
ble to investors’ interests in an effort to attract investment. As such, SEE offers a unique 
opportunity to investigate the assumed downward spiral effect from different regulatory 
starting points. This represents a novel evaluation of Chinese capital which is particu-
larly relevant given the intensification of anti- Chinese FDI policy and rhetoric by the EU 
in recent years (Rogelja and Tsimonis, 2020). As major Chinese capital flows into SEE 
are a trend of the last decade, the article is also timely in being able to track the develop-
ment of Chinese projects and their impact on environmental standards in the region and 
to identify emerging trends that may also be applicable at a European level.
The article also contributes to the literature on state- investor relations, specifically 
transnational state- owned enterprises that for the most part, over 19 per cent globally, 
come from China (Babic et al., 2017). Examining the investment and financing behaviour, 
negotiating priorities and sustainability policies of large Chinese transnationals is linked 
to understanding the role of host states and supranational regulatory frameworks pre-
cisely because Chinese companies have faced a steep learning curve in their effort to 
seek business overseas (Jacoby, 2014), suggesting their practices are still in flux and 
reflect host state regimes as much as they do domestic Chinese institutional arrange-
ments. Consequently, our work does not tend toward the “comparative capitalisms” 
approach, which emphasises modelling relations between the owner state and state- 
owned enterprise (compare Nölke et al., 2015 on “state- permeated market economies”). 
Instead, we emphasise host state- investor relations as an important variable that helps us 
understand the behaviour of transnational corporations from emerging economies such 
as China, as they co- create different practices and regulatory norms in liminal regions 
such as SEE.
Methodology and Argument
Under the rubric of “Chinese outward capital,” we include FDI as well as other overseas 
flows such as concessional loans resulting in contracted work for Chinese companies, 
following the work of Lee (2018) on varieties of capital and Klinger and Muldavin 
(2019) on the need to approach state, capital and development in a multi- scalar way. By 
using the term “Chinese capital,” we also emphasise the role of China’s state- led econ-
omy while at the same time allowing for differentiation on a case by case basis.
This study represents a collaborative methodological design combining fieldwork 
with input from civil society, by bringing in the views of participants on the ground as 
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co- authors of the analysis of China’s outward capital. The great variety of potential cases 
across SEE states required an exploratory phase to map recent developments. This stage 
culminated in a workshop titled “Chinese Investment in the Balkans: an Environmental 
Perspective” that took place in Athens on 14–15 June 2018, funded by King’s College 
London and organised in conjunction with the Mediterannean Programme for 
International Environmental Law & Negotiation (MEPIELAN), Panteion University. 
The workshop brought together environmental non- governmental organisations (NGOs) 
from SEE, local civil society groups and researchers, focusing on the experiences of civil 
society on the environmental challenges associated with Chinese capital.
We paid particular attention to the resilience and implementation of regulatory stan-
dards, the role and interplay between local, regional, EU and Chinese actors, the observed 
impact of Chinese capital on the environment and local communities and the way it 
compares to Western investors. The workshop provided us with empirical evidence from 
the ground that we could then fact- check, corroborate and analyse in this article. 
Unfortunately, the debate on Chinese capital has long been dominated by often exagger-
ated and unsubstantiated threat perceptions, political discourse and sinophobic or sino-
philic attitudes (for more on this see Pavlićević, 2018; Rogelja and Tsimonis, 2020). By 
focusing on specific issues of compliance, even of a “technical” nature, we aim at recal-
ibrating the debate on Chinese capital in Europe towards a more meaningful – for our 
societies – fact- based discussion on its actual impact. By doing so, we are not disregard-
ing the broader picture of the developmental and political implications of Chinese capi-
tal, thereby “missing the forest for the trees.” On the contrary, we fear that the debate 
around the real or imagined security implications of Chinese economic presence in 
Europe has deflected attention on its impact on environment, health, labour standards 
and local communities. By bringing in specific cases, we aim at identifying common 
practices and developmental understandings of Chinese companies, analyse possible 
trends, and foster further thinking on local and regional regulatory gaps and possible 
policy responses.
Regarding the projects we analyse in this article, from twelve cases examined during 
the workshop, we decided to concentrate on the port of Piraeus (Greece), the Kostolac 
power plant (Serbia), the Stanari power plant (Bosnia- Herzegovina ), the construction of 
the Kičevo- Ohrid highway (North Macedonia) and the Patos- Marinza oil field (Albania). 
Our purposeful sampling followed four criteria: (1) the importance of the project, with 
all the cases being among the largest inflows of Chinese capital in each state; (2) its 
environmental impact, concentrating on contested cases; (3) cross- sectoral representa-
tion and whether it matters in the way Chinese companies engage and comply to envi-
ronmental concerns and standards and (4) the host countries’ degree of association with 
the EU, to assess the latter’s regulatory influence. This allowed us to focus on analysing 
how Chinese capital poses challenges to sustainability and environmental protection, 
rather than answering whether such projects are damaging or not.
The aforementioned cases have raised serious environmental concerns in different 
sectors (transport, energy, construction and oil extraction) and in countries that range 
from full EU membership (Greece), full candidate status under accession negotiations 
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(Serbia), candidate countries with negotiations not yet under way (Albania and North 
Macedonia) and potential candidate status (Bosnia- Herzegovina) (European Commission, 
n.d. [b]). This purposeful sampling enabled us to capture the complexity of the regional 
picture and accommodate the rich detail pertinent to each case while allowing us to 
reflect on the “big picture” of the impact of Chinese capital in the region as a whole. 
Further, concentrating on controversial cases allowed us to best examine the factors 
behind the downward regulatory effect observed in these projects. By concentrating on 
substantial and problematic cases, we tried to unpack the complex dynamics involved 
and test the validity of an often held assumption of an inevitable trade- off between 
Chinese capital and environmental standards, what we call the “bad investors, weak 
hosts” approach. The close examination of problematic cases enables us to trace the 
development of these projects, assign responsibility to the various actors involved and 
identify possible courses of action for national and European policy makers. It should 
also be noted that the Albanian, Bosnian, Greek and Macedonian cases represent the 
single largest flow of Chinese capital into each country, while the Serbian case is the 
second largest. Cumulatively, the projects amount to over EUR 1.8 billion in loans and 
EUR 750 million in direct investment through acquisitions. For a comparison, the total 
value of Chinese loans currently active in SEE stood at EUR 4.480 billion in January 
2019 (data compiled by the authors).
All of the cases examined were contested to some degree by coalitions of civil society 
actors. We do not imply that these contestations are apolitical or without specific agenda. 
Rather, we see in them an important factor that defines the process of localisation of 
Chinese capital, but also argue that the framing of contestation (as a social justice issue, 
a question of compliance, market liberalisation, EU accession, etc.) suggests that civil 
society tactics reflect how local conditions define optimal modes of contestation. Given 
the support of the host state for the projects in question, civil society mobilisation is 
often one of the first barriers Chinese capital has faced.
Throughout the article we juxtapose the EU as a normative and regulatory entity to 
incoming Chinese capital originating from a different developmental context. The EU 
provides civil society with regulatory standards and legal instruments, thus setting the 
benchmark for them to evaluate the sustainability of these projects. Furthermore, EU 
accession is a key incentive motivating infrastructural upgrading in the region, featuring 
in EU Accession reports (European Commission, 2018) and seen as an important goal by 
lending bodies such as the European Investment Bank (EIB, 2018). Yet without ambi-
tious financing support, SEE countries often have no choice but to turn to Chinese loans 
or investors. But by concentrating on the EU we do not implicitly suggest a binary of 
“good Europe versus bad China.” We understand Chinese capital as amenable and adapt-
able to new contexts, and therefore as an opportunity to test the ability of national and 
European mechanisms to enforce compliance, promote best practice and socialise 
Chinese companies to the more regulated European business context. In addition, as all 
Balkan countries have either joined or are aspiring to join the EU (European Commission, 
2019a), they have to meet specific regulatory requirements and conform to policy goals 
such as the rapid reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (European Commission, 2019b). 
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In this regard, the availability of Chinese capital has in some cases delayed transition to 
cleaner forms of energy by investing in coal factories (Doehler, 2019) and in others has 
promoted green industries (Pencea, 2017; Spasić, 2018). This variety of outcomes 
demonstrates that both national- level actors and EU frameworks have to be considered 
when we assess challenges posed by Chinese capital for environmental sustainability.
We argue that the challenges Chinese capital poses emanate from a combination of 
factors: (1) a disregard for regulatory standards and related technical and legal know- 
how by Chinese companies due to their understanding of environmental issues as a mat-
ter of bilateral negotiations rather than compliance; (2) the complicity of local actors, 
mainly political and economic elites which, by trying to “lure” investors, undermine the 
enforcement of regulatory frameworks and sustainability goals and (3) the ambivalence 
of the EU in terms of its developmental priorities and commitment to sustainability that 
results in regional regulatory gaps and anaemic monitoring mechanisms, but also in 
terms of enlargement and the future of SEE.
Our findings identify an unfortunate “synergy of failures” by the actors involved as 
the heart of the problem. On the one hand, Chinese investors tend to disregard the neces-
sity of environmental impact assessments (EIAs), the need for compliance with local 
regulatory frameworks and the importance of engaging with local communities and civil 
society. On the other hand, host governments demonstrate a lack of political will to pur-
sue sustainable development or enforce compliance, especially at the entry point, which 
renders them primarily responsible for the negative environmental impact of these proj-
ects. The closed nature of bilateral negotiations mitigates against effective civil society 
oversight until many of the environmentally damaging effects are already happening, or 
at least until the project has taken on an institutional inertia which can be difficult to stop. 
This is particularly relevant given the high level of host state involvement in many of the 
Chinese- invested projects in SEE. The reliance of Chinese investors on compliant 
national governments is, however, also a point of concern for the investors themselves. 
Public protest, intervention by European or national regulatory authorities or a change of 
government can jeopardise such projects.
The third aspect of this synergy of failures is the ambivalence of the EU on key policy 
areas. Is privatisation a prerequisite for sustainability? Do SEE countries have a future in 
the EU? What challenges does third- country capital bring? While doubtlessly exerting 
structural power (Pavlićević, 2019), the EU is at best ambivalent and its policies can 
contradict its long term goals, setting up conflicting incentives for host governments and 
foreign investors and lenders. This synergy of failures results not so much in a “race” to 
the bottom, but rather a “drift” to the lowest common denominator of compliance with 
environmental standards.
To put in a nutshell, across all cases we find that although Chinese companies bring 
an understanding of development that contradicts European norms and regulations on 
sustainability, their failure to comply with local standards and practices is equally attrib-
utable to the laxity of host governments and the absence of adequate supervision by 
European institutions. In that regard, the next step for the EU is to introduce sustainabil-
ity as a key aspect of its foreign investment screening mechanism. Such a move would 
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assist host governments and/or local societies in enforcing the compliance of Chinese 
actors to local standards, managing the latter’s expectations and improving the environ-
mental impact of these projects.
Our examination of the selected cases will begin with the gradual acquisition of the 
Greek Piraeus Port Authority by COSCO, China’s landmark investment in SEE. We will 
then continue with the China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) construction 
of the Kostolac coal power plant in Serbia and Dongfang Electric’s plant in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina’s Stanari, the construction of the Kičevo- Ohrid highway in North 
Macedonia by Sinohydro, and fracking at Patos- Marinza oil field in Albania by GeoJade/
Bankers Petroleum. We will then continue with a comparative analysis of the cases to 
identify the interplay of Chinese, host state and regional actors.
Piraeus Port, Greece
The first case under investigation is COSCO’s gradual acquisition of the Piraeus Port 
Authority (PPA). The PPA is the largest port operator in Greece and one of the most 
important in Europe. Its infrastructure and activities include container handling, coastal 
shipping, cruises, car handling and ship repair. The port spans across Piraeus and four 
adjacent cities: Drapetsona/Keratsini, Perama and Salamina. In October 2009, following 
an international tender, the PPA granted the Piraeus Cargo Terminal SA (PCT), a subsid-
iary of COSCO (one of the largest container- terminal operators globally), the concession 
of Container Pier II for 35 years (henceforth “Concession deal”). The deal also stipulated 
the construction of Container Pier III. Six years later, the Greek government agreed to 
privatise the PPA (under Law 4336/2015) as part of the third bailout agreement signed 
with the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (commonly referred to as the Troika) in August 2015, which contained 
austerity measures and privatisation obligations. As COSCO was the sole bidder in the 
2016 tender, it acquired 51 per cent of the PPA and will gain a further 15.7 per cent in 
2021 (Law 4404/2016).
The privatisation process of Piraeus Port started in 2005–2006 as part of an economic 
reform programme by the conservative (New Democracy) government of the time. 
Although the social- democrats (PASOK) and the left (SYRIZA) voted against it when in 
opposition, they eventually supported the PPA’s privatisation when they formed govern-
ments, in 2009 and 2015, respectively. From 2014 onwards, COSCO’s presence in 
Piraeus has been linked to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and has been used by both 
the Greek and Chinese governments as an example of a win- win project (China Daily, 
2016; Τo Vima, 2018). Conversely, trade unions, local communities, environmental 
groups and parties of the left have long opposed the privatisation for being unnecessary 
since the PPA under public ownership was profitable, for diverting profits from the local 
economy to shareholders, and for facilitating the casualization of employment and an 
overall decline in labour standards (Federation of Greek Port Workers, 2018; Frantzeskaki, 
2016; Limani tis Agonias, 2011). Characteristically, in 2009–2010 the concession of 
Container Terminals 2 and 3 resulted in the loss of 500 full- time jobs. Up to 2019 around 
1,500 jobs had been created in the PCT/COSCO area, yet 90 per cent of them are 
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part- time, while there is no collective bargaining agreement (Federation of Greek Port 
Workers, 2018; Frantzeskaki, 2016).
Throughout the privatisation process, the various environmental implications of the 
two deals were given secondary importance. Even before 2008, there were several prob-
lems emanating from port activities, but they have since intensified considerably, includ-
ing air pollution from cars, tour buses, container trucks, cargo and passenger ships; water 
pollution from ships; noise and light pollution from ships and the operation of port 
machinery; the location of fuel silos within the urban area of Perama; and the future of 
the vacated fertiliser plant at Lipasmata (Maragkogianni and Papaefthimiou, 2015; 
Sakellariadou et al., 2001; Tzannatos, 2010). People’s grievances have focused mainly 
on air pollution and traffic, and on the port’s expansion that shut off land and blocked 
access to the seafront. These issues have been raised by grassroots movements and chan-
nelled through local MPs and the local government, but bottom- up initiatives were more 
effective when the PPA was under public ownership.
In the 2008 concession of Cargo Terminals II and III, references to environment pro-
tection were vague and stipulated no penalties (Law 3755/2009). In 2009, PCT/COSCO 
proceeded with the expansion of Pier III, without public consultation and despite oppo-
sition by both the authorities and citizens of Perama on environmental grounds. 
Furthermore, grievances on noise and light pollution, as well as on emissions from ships 
and cargo terminal machinery, were directed to the publicly owned PPA, which had no 
legal right to interfere in the concession part of the port. Since 2016, the point of conten-
tion has been the COSCO- owned PPA’s new Master Plan, which covers all existing port 
operations and future infrastructure upgrades ( Capital. gr, 2019; Articles 6.2c, 6.2e, 6.3 
and ANNEX 7.2 of the 2016 Concession Agreement). During this period, COSCO sub-
mitted seven different versions of the Master Plan, all of which were rejected on techni-
cal, financial and environmental grounds.
According to sources within the PPA, the Chinese management lacked the necessary 
know- how on compliance processes, treating it as a bureaucratic box- ticking exercise. 
This was partly because the conservative government, under which the 2008 Concession 
agreement was signed, imposed regulatory standards with laxity. This changed under a 
new government in 2015, resulting in COSCO being unprepared and unwilling to com-
ply with the existing regulatory framework.
Although most of these investments have a major environmental impact, public con-
sultation never took place, while the required Strategic Environmental Impact 
Assessments (SEIAs) have yet to be completed. The controversial expansion of the 
cruise terminal, 95 per cent of which will be funded by the EU, is the most characteristic 
example (PPA, 2017). Without public consultation and an SEIA in place, local citizens 
have mobilized to oppose the proposed expansion due to air pollution caused by engines 
in constant operation of cruise ships hoteling close to residential areas. Other invest-
ments, including the development of a 42,000 sqm logistics centre and the upgrade of the 
ship repairing zone (PPA, 2017) have also raised important environmental concerns as 
they will increase marine and road traffic in already congested areas (Limani tis Agonias, 
2011).
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The PPA Privatisation Law (4404/2016), which ratified the agreement between the 
Greek government and COSCO, limited the scope and weakened the compulsory char-
acter of the consultation process. First, it restricted consultation to the jurisdiction of the 
Municipality of Piraeus, excluding adjacent municipalities that are more affected by port 
activities. Second, Article 6.6 stipulated that the consultation process will not have the 
power to stop or delay any project with pre- existing approval, in effect rendering the 
whole process an empty shell. This partly reflected the weak position of the Greek gov-
ernment which, under the EU bailout agreement, had to rapidly privatise the PPA. To 
make matters worse, in the first round of consultation, civil society and major NGOs 
such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) were excluded. The municipality of 
Piraeus organised its own consultation ( Aftodioikisi. gr, 2018), but without a Master Plan 
to scrutinise, civil society groups were not given the opportunity to discuss the signifi-
cant environmental, social and economic impacts of COSCO’s plans. Although several 
unused land areas of the PPA were permanently given to local municipalities (Law 
4404/2016, Article 19), the Piraeus Municipality, the regional government of Attica and 
civil society organisations raised environmental concerns on COSCO’s plans for the port 
and complained about its lack of commitment to meaningful public consultation ( Newsit. 
gr, 2018).
Since the privatisation, local communities have mobilised around the expansion of 
the cruise terminal in Piraeus and the removal of fuel tanks in Perama, organising public 
meetings, demonstrations, and petitions to local authorities. In Piraeus, more than 5,000 
people have signed against the expansion of the cruise terminal, but COSCO, unlike the 
PPA management under public ownership, has repeatedly refused to meet with civil 
society representatives ( Reportaznet. gr, 2018). In October 2018, residents of Perama 
protested against COSCO’s trespassing on municipal land as part of Cargo Pier III 
expansion works, causing the immediate intervention of the municipal and regional gov-
ernment authorities that forced COSCO to withdraw (Papastathopoulou, 2018). Despite 
constant pressure from the Chinese Embassy in Athens and Chinese officials, the Master 
Plan that includes the SEIAs for all agreed and proposed infrastructure upgrades was not 
approved by the SYRIZA government, which insisted on COSCO complying with the 
environmental legal framework (Τo Vima, 2018). However, COSCO’s port operations 
continue uninterrupted, taking advantage of the port’s importance for the national econ-
omy at a time of recovery from a decade of crisis.
To sum up, COSCO has brought its own understanding of environmental issues as of 
secondary importance in its port operations in Piraeus, treating compliance as a matter 
of bilateral negotiation. Similarly, the combination of lacking know- how on EU and 
national environmental standards and the experience of their lax enforcement under the 
2008 Concession deal, has made the Chinese management unwilling to adapt to demands 
for a more regulated, responsive and transparent mode of operation post-2016.
Kostolac Coal Power Plant, Serbia
The over- reliance of SEE on lignite coal (Euracoal, 2017; Milatovic and Chung, 2018) 
is a reality that renders EU requirements for transition to cleaner forms of energy a 
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complex endeavour. In this regard, the involvement of Chinese companies in the regional 
energy sector appears to pander to the Balkan states’ questionable commitment to sus-
tainability by enabling “dirty” energy projects – which Western funders are not willing 
to support any longer (Parnell, 2018). The Kostolac coal power plant in Serbia offers a 
useful case to examine the impact of Chinese capital in delaying transition to cleaner 
forms of energy by enabling the perpetuation of the host state’s political preference for 
carbon- based energy production.
Serbia’s state- owned utility Elektroprivreda Srbije (EPS) is building a new 350 MW 
lignite plant at Kostolac in the country’s north- east, alongside two already existing units. 
This is the second phase of a project implemented by the China Machinery Engineering 
Corporation (CMEC) and financed by the China Export- Import Bank (China Exim). The 
first phase, for which a USD 293 million financing contract was signed between the 
Government of the Republic of Serbia and China Exim on 29 December 2011, consisted 
of the modernisation of the existing units, the construction of a desulphurisation system, 
a landing dock on the Danube and an associated railway infrastructure.
The Serbian government signed an agreement with CMEC for the construction of the 
new unit in November 2013. No tender procedure took place because the Chinese and 
Serbian governments had signed an intergovernmental agreement in 2009 which exempts 
joint projects from public tender obligations. Following the signing of the commercial 
agreement with CMEC, a second, USD 608 million loan was agreed between the Serbian 
government and China Exim in December 2014 for the new unit and the expansion of 
the Drmno open cast lignite mine, whose annual production would increase from nine to 
twelve million tonnes (EPS, 2016: 56).
Preparations on the Kostolac project began in January 2015, when the Serbian parlia-
ment ratified – in a fast track procedure designed to minimise opposition scrutiny 
(Interview 1) – the second loan agreement with China Exim. Since then, the project has 
been dogged by numerous irregularities. First, the Serbian government took the loan on 
behalf of its state- owned utility EPS, raising issues of compliance with its state aid obli-
gations under the Energy Community Treaty (Staviczky and Nicolaides, 2015). Second, 
the feasibility study summary left out carbon costs on the assumption that they would be 
covered by the state. In practice, however, state aid rules that apply to Serbia as a signa-
tory to the Energy Community Treaty forbid this kind of payment. At the same time, the 
project’s sensitivity analysis, which does include carbon costs, leaves no doubt that even 
a low CO2 price is enough to render the plant uneconomic. Lastly, with the European 
Union updating its legislation governing industrial emissions in November 2017, 
Kostolac B3 would now be obliged to adhere to emissions limits stricter than those set 
in the EIA decision from October 2017. This means that should Serbia continue towards 
EU accession, Kostolac would already be saddled with expensive retrofit costs necessary 
to bring the plant in line with EU standards (Gallop, 2017).
Although the Serbian prime minister announced the completion of works at the 
Kostolac B1 and B2 desulphurisation units in August 2017, news reports mentioned that 
the issuing of operating permits was still pending (Energetski Portal, 2017). There is no 
publicly available information to this day regarding the existence of an operating permit, 
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which raises the question of how the Chinese financier and contractor can ensure that all 
the legal obligations in the host country are adhered to. Also, according to eyewitness 
reports, the desulphurisation system seemed to be inoperative more often than not. 
Following these accounts, the Serbian Centre for Ecology and Sustainable Development 
(CEKOR) requested the Environmental Inspectorate’s intervention. In its response, the 
inspectorate stated that
At the time of the previous inspection in November 2017, it was established that the desul-
phurization unit was in a test phase in March and April 2017, after which it did not work, 
since the construction of the landfill for the gypsum, which is created in the operation of this 
plant, has not been completed. (Letter from EI to CEKOR, 1 March 2018)
This raises concerns regarding both the contractor and the investor’s ability to man-
age the project successfully and efficiently.
Apart from the irregularities mentioned above, the project comes with significant 
environmental costs. If the project is completed, the village of Drmno, where a core 
group of locals are requesting to be resettled, would become cut off from the rest of the 
world, having the Kostolac B power plant complex to the north, the huge Drmno open-
cast mine to north- east, east and south and to the west, a new dock on the Danube, where 
equipment for the new unit will be imported. Many locals are experiencing damage to 
their houses because of the mining operations which drain underground water and cause 
the soil to sink, but also due to vibrations from heavy machinery transiting through the 
village or operating too close to their houses (Petovar and Jokić, 2016). Most of the 
farmland in the village area has already been bought up by EPS to ensure that its mine 
expansion plans can go ahead without opposition. Ironically, locals have no job oppor-
tunities apart from the same company whose mining operations are destroying their 
houses and polluting the air (Ciuta, 2016). During the tragic floods that hit the Balkans 
in 2014, the Kostolac B power plant narrowly avoided being flooded thanks to the tire-
less work of plant workers, firefighters and civilian volunteers. While their efforts were 
successful – unlike at Kolubara and Nikola Tesla plants, which were seriously affected 
by the floods – later that year a separate flooding incident saw unit A2 at Kostolac closed 
for several days, while the Drmno mine was also partially flooded.
Similar to Piraeus, assessing the environmental impact is a key aspect in the Kostolac 
case. The first EIA for Kostolac B3 was approved in December 2013 but it did not 
include an analysis of transboundary impacts (the site is just 15 km from the Romanian 
border) and suffered from numerous other deficiencies. It was therefore challenged in the 
administrative court in Serbia by CEKOR and at the Espoo Convention Implementation 
Committee by Bankwatch Romania. In March 2015, the Espoo Convention 
Implementation Committee noted that the construction of a unit at the Kostolac lignite 
power plant was an activity listed in Appendix I to the Convention and that the likeli-
hood of a significant adverse transboundary impact could not be excluded. Therefore, 
the Committee asked Serbia to comply with its obligations under the Convention and to 
notify Romania about the EIA. This was the first time that the Committee opened an 
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initiative related to cross- border impacts of a coal fired power plant. In June 2016, the 
Serbian administrative court ruled that CEKOR’s arguments were valid and that the 
decision to approve the environmental assessment should be revoked. By this time, how-
ever, the original decision had already expired and a new environmental assessment had 
to be carried out.
The new EIA process took place in 2017, included transboundary consultations, 
and was approved in September. However, it still failed to ensure compliance with 
updated EU pollution standards (Ciuta and Gallop, 2017), the so- called LCP BREF, 
and didn’t address the concerns of residents of the Drmno regarding their health and 
property damage. Therefore, CEKOR again challenged the decision in court. In 
September 2018, a complaint was submitted to the Energy Community Secretariat by 
CEE Bankwatch and CEKOR, alleging Serbia’s non- compliance with the EIA 
Directive for the Drmno mine expansion. Consequently, the Espoo Convention 
Implementation Committee re- opened the investigation into the mine expansion being 
carried out without a transboundary impact assessment (UN Economic Commission 
for Europe, 2018).
To sum up, despite economic, environmental and health concerns, the Serbian gov-
ernment seems adamant to go ahead with this project, signalling a high level of political 
will that overrides questions about economic feasibility and sustainability. Kostolac B3 
is referred to as the country’s most important energy infrastructure project in the last 
thirty years and is listed as a priority in the implementation programme for the coun-
try’s energy strategy (Government of the Republic of Serbia, 2017). While financing 
and construction are done by Chinese actors, the project is chiefly driven by unwaver-
ing domestic political commitment. Yet at the same time, Western institutional lenders 
have not followed such a blasé approach to satisfying domestic, European and interna-
tional regulations and norms. They enforce transparent environmental, social and 
access to information policies, which facilitate timely social scrutiny even in the face of 
overwhelming host state support, as the cessation of coal financing by the European 
Investment Bank, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the 
World Bank clearly demonstrates. In contrast, Chinese infrastructural projects are gov-
erned by the 2009 bilateral cooperation treaty, which tasks the host state with providing 
administrative support. The pre- contract on the project’s implementation states that 
Serbia’s national power utility will provide all necessary documentation (EPS, 2010), 
but there are no provisions beyond this general and vague commitment, no references 
to the project’s environmental sustainability aspect, nor are they present in the financing 
agreement between the Serbian government and China Exim bank (Official Gazette of 
the Republic of Serbia, 2012). This lack of compliance together with oversight mecha-
nisms means the Chinese investor has to blindly trust the host state to arrange for the 
legality of the project. Yet without the necessary instruments of transparency, oversight 
by domestic civil society and regional regulatory frameworks is difficult, leaving such 
projects vulnerable to intended and accidental malpractice and the breaking of rules and 
norms.
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Stanari Coal Power Plant, Bosnia-Herzegovina
In the case of the Stanari power plant, Chinese capital perpetuated an environmentally 
damaging operation through cooperation with local actors, undermining compliance 
with European environmental standards. Dongfang Electric, a Chinese state- owned 
enterprise (SOE), constructed a “dirty” power plant for a local private investor that relied 
on the availability of Chinese financing for coal- related projects, at a time when European 
funding was directed to decarbonisation.
The Stanari power plant is situated in the northwest of the Serbian entity of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska. The site is located next to one of the largest lignite 
fields in the region, which has been mined since 1948, when efforts to electrify the nation 
led to the introduction of many open pits across former Yugoslavia. In 2004, the mine 
was taken over by Energy Financing Team (EFT) Group, a major private power trader in 
the region, headed by Serbian businessperson Vuk Hamović. Because lignite as a fuel is 
heavy and can spontaneously combust, it is not ideally suited to transportation over large 
distances. For an energy trading company such as EFT therefore, the construction of a 
power plant next to the mine must have always been the objective, even though it did not 
feature in the entity’s energy strategy until 2008, when a concession for the exploitation 
of the mine and the construction of a new power plant was signed between the Srpska 
government and EFT. That EFT was the subject of an investigation by the UK Serious 
Fraud Office in 2005 did not seem to matter (Leigh and Evans, 2005). The concession 
agreed in 2008 was for a 420 MW power plant that would supply 3,000 GWh annually, 
more than half of Srpska’s total production. Quickly however, this commitment was 
reduced to 2,000 GWh with a series of annexes that above all fit EFT’s needs (Commission 
for Cconcessions of Republika Srpska, 2018; Tešić, 2018). As the project gained momen-
tum, environmental activists became concerned about potential European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development funding for the project, which however never materi-
alised as the bank moved away from financing coal- related projects in 2013, leaving 
EFT struggling to find a source of funding for its plant.
It is into this situation that the Chinese team entered, led by the China Development 
Bank (CDB) as financier and Dongfang Electric as contractor. The plant, which became 
operational in 2016, cost an estimated EUR 550 million, of which EUR 350 million was 
sourced from the CDB loan. Compared with the acquisition of Piraeus Port or the sover-
eign loans to Serbia and North Macedonia, the Chinese financier ostensibly dealt with a 
private business and not the state. Yet the role of the host state was crucial in getting the 
project completed. Throughout the process, the Srpska government supported Stanari 
with two means, by changing domestic regulations and laws, and by reducing costs for 
EFT. The possibility of secret guarantees notwithstanding, the Srpska Republic could 
not act as a guarantor for the CDB loan. Moreover, the entity’s laws did not allow for 
concession rights to be transferred to a new concessionaire in case of default or bank-
ruptcy, which could have had serious repercussions for the Chinese bank. In June 2011, 
therefore, the government issued new rules which were designed to allay the Chinese 
bank’s fears. By allowing the transfer of concessionary rights “... when the concession 
holder cannot realize its obligations to the creditor…” (Official Gazette of Republika 
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Srpska, 2011), the state in effect allowed EFT to use its concession rights as collateral for 
the loan. Should EFT default on its loan, the CDB can demand concession rights be 
transferred to it or to a nominated third concessionaire.
Apart from regulatory support, the state also reduced costs for the plant operator by 
reducing concession fees for coal power generation from 3.6 per cent to 0.2 per cent of 
total revenue, and exempting it from coal mining fees completely with a change to the 
concessions law that effectively applies only to EFT (CIN, 2014; Official Gazette of 
Republika Srpska, 2018). One of the biggest changes however took place even before 
the plant was built. The plant’s environmental impact has been a cause of concern among 
environmental groups and local residents long before the involvement of Dongfang 
Electric and CDB, yet proponents of the plant cited its efficiency (Cero, 2016). The orig-
inal plan for a pulverised supercritical boiler with a maximum capacity of 420 MW 
agreed in 2008 was however altered during the negotiation process to a 300 MW design 
based on a subcritical circulating fluidised boiler. While this technology is more appro-
priate for the burning of sub- standard coals such as lignite, the redesign meant the plant’s 
energy efficiency also dropped and Stanari will not adhere to the EU’s Industrial 
Emissions Directive in the future. More importantly, although the redesign was drastic, 
involving the installation of less efficient technologies, the Srpska Republic decided that 
no new environmental impact assessment study was necessary at the time (CEE 
Bankwatch, n.d.).
The Stanari case shows how Chinese financing may end up funding projects of dubi-
ous provenance, sustain non- transparent practices, as well as contribute to delays in 
decarbonisation. But it also demonstrates the agency of local actors such as EFT, which 
was instrumental in bringing the Chinese finance package to Stanari, and the key role of 
the host state in weakening environmental protection by waiving the requirement for a 
new EIA and reducing concession fees for coal power generation. Further, as in the case 
of Kostolac in Serbia, the construction of a new coal power plant only a few miles away 
from the EU’s borders signifies the emissions regulation gap in the region that is sus-
tained by the unclear accession prospect of Bosnia- Herzegovina, allowing it to delay the 
implementation of stricter EU norms which took effect in 2017 (European Commission, 
n.d. [a]). Apart from Stanari, there are a further six coal power plants being planned with 
Chinese funding, three of which (Banovići, Tuzla 7 and Gacko II) are in advanced stages 
of negotiation. The EU may be phasing out coal in its member states, but Chinese con-
tractors are building new coal power plants on its doorstep – plants that will export their 
power into the EU. Once more, a synergy of failures on behalf of local and regional 
actors actively encourages environmentally unsustainable practices by Chinese 
investors.
Kičevo-Ohrid Highway in North Macedonia
The Chinese involvement in North Macedonia’s highways was part of an effort by the 
former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski to attract foreign investment in the country. In 
July 2013, a Macedonian delegation visited China to showcase investment opportunities 
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to Chinese companies. A few months later, on November 2013 officials from the govern-
ment of North Macedonia and China Exim signed a loan agreement of USD 580 million 
for two new motorway segments (Dreher et al., 2017). The agreement was decided with-
out a tender. The construction of the 56.7 km long Kičevo- Ohrid highway began in 
March 2014, and will eventually become part of the Pan- European Corridor 8, linking 
the country with Bulgaria to the east and Albania to the west. The construction of the 53 
km Miladinovci-Štip motorway will provide the city of Štip with access to Pan- European 
Corridor 10, which connects North Macedonia with Greece and Serbia. The interest rate 
on that loan is 2 per cent with a payback period of twenty years and a grace period of five 
years. The loan agreement further stipulates that the Chinese Sinohydro Corporation 
Limited, a company suspended from World Bank projects since December 2013 (MLex, 
2016), will provide oversight and 49 per cent of the construction labour force. According 
to the contract for the construction of the motorways, Sinohydro Corporation Limited is 
the main contractor, the Macedonian Granit Construction Stock Co is the nominated 
sub- contractor, the Consorcium GIM, Euroconsulting and GEING Krebs und Kiefer are 
designated as the engineers of the projects, while the Macedonian public enterprise for 
state roads is the employer (Granit Construction Stock Co, 2014). As such, the deal is 
typical of Chinese projects in Southeast Europe that combine Chinese construction and 
financing without a tender.
A series of environmental and geotechnical issues put the sustainability of the project 
into question. First, in 2016, UNESCO raised concerns about the environmental impact 
of the highways on the Natural and Cultural Heritage of the Ohrid region, noting the 
absence of a strategic environmental assessment (SEA) in relation to the construction 
plans (UNESCO, 2016). Following an evaluation of the situation on the field in 2017, 
UNESCO also requested that the government of North Macedonia urgently undertakes 
“a comprehensive comparative study of alternative routes for the railway of the Pan 
European Corridor VIII.” The new government of North Macedonia committed to com-
pleting the SEA by October 2018, but a 2019 draft decision places the region on 
UNESCO’s endangered heritage list (UNESCO, 2019).
Second, the Kičevo- Ohrid highway cuts through the natural habitat of the Balkan 
lynx, a critically endangered species according to the International Union for Conservation 
of Nature (Melovski et al., 2015). Their tiny population of around thirty animals has 
been declining due to pressures from infrastructure projects in the area, yet no green 
corridors were planned for the Kičevo- Ohrid highway. Rather than a choice between 
development and preservation, this is better understood as a failure to implement already 
agreed and tested measures to mitigate the undesirable effects of development.
Poor planning affected not only the environmental impact provisions of the deal but 
the actual construction of the highway as well. The main issue at hand was land erosion, 
as North Macedonia is one of the most affected countries in the Balkans, with 96.5 per 
cent of its total area under threat of erosion. In the western part of the country, where the 
Kičevo- Ohrid highway construction is located, the terrain is steep and rugged, caused by 
deep erosion (Blinkov and Andonovska, 2008). Although the problem is well known, in 
July 2018 the current minister of transport Gjorgji Sugareski announced that poor 
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planning has led to landslides on parts of the section, delaying the entire project ( Sdk. 
mk, 2017). The government launched a public inquiry, which discovered that the project 
lacked minimal geotechnical and geomechanical soil testing, leading to severe problems 
in certain parts of the highway. As a result of the above, construction work on the Kičevo- 
Ohrid highway stopped in 2017, as the project faced many unplanned delays which 
raised its total cost.
The above were just some of the many irregularities involved in this project. The inquiry 
also revealed unsolved expropriation disputes that increased the cost of the project further. 
To make matters worse, the 2015 wire- tap scandal (Robinson and Casule, 2015) exposed 
evidence of extensive corruption by Gruevski himself and other members of his govern-
ment involving foreign deals. In May 2017, the Special Prosecution (SJO) launched a cor-
ruption investigation codenamed “Traektorija” (Marusic, 2017; Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
Republic of North Macedonia, 2015) which is linked to the construction of the highways. 
VMRO- DPMNE, North Macedonia’s ruling party at the time of the highway construction 
agreement, and former prime minister Nikola Gruevski were accused of money laundering 
and illegal financing. Following these and other charges of corruption 
( Akademik. mk, 2017), Gruevski fled the country and has been granted asylum in Hungary 
(RFE/RL, 2018). Although initially set for a trial in absentia, the time limitation on the 
“Traektorija” case ultimately expired in late 2019 ( Akademik. mk, 2019). As for the project 
itself, after a year of negotiation with Sinohydro Corporation Limited, the newly elected 
Macedonian government led by prime minister Zoran Zaev signed a third annex to the 
agreement with the company at the beginning of November 2018 and agreed to add EUR 
187 million to the original price so construction work can continue (Government of the 
Republic of Northern Macedonia, 2018). The government will take out a new loan from the 
China Exim, increasing the total cost of the Kičevo- Ohrid road from EUR 411 to EUR 598 
million.
To sum up, the Kičevo- Ohrid highway case highlights the regulatory weaknesses 
involved in bilateral loan- to- construct deals that are typical of Chinese construction in the 
region. Without an international tender, corruption and disregard for environmental impact 
have undermined the completion of the highway that has since become a controversial proj-
ect. Responsibility for this situation lies primarily with the two parts involved, Sinohydro 
and the former Macedonian government, but mainly at the latter’s unwillingness to assess 
the highway’s sustainability. At the same time, the EU’s ambiguity on North Macedonia’s 
accession means that the current regulatory weaknesses can only be remedied through 
domestic changes, not through harmonisation with EU standards and laws.
Fracking in Patos-Marinza, Albania
On 25 February 2017, a group of protesters, including hunger strikers carried in wheel-
barrows, reached Tirana after a four day march from their home village of Zharrëz in 
South Albania. The group, supported by civil society organisation Nisma Thurje (Hashtag 
Initiative) and encouraged by people along their route, came to the capital to protest 
against hydraulic fracturing (commonly known as “fracking”) taking place at the 
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Patos- Marinza oil field, next to their village. Just a few days later, the Albanian govern-
ment issued a nationwide moratorium on fracking and agreed to compensate the villag-
ers for damages to their property (Koleka, 2017).
In this case, the Chinese investor, private company GeoJade, did not negotiate initial 
entry into the country, nor did it participate in the first three years of mediation handled by 
the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO, the compliance mechanism of the World 
Bank’s private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation or IFC). GeoJade, upon 
taking over the Canadian company Bankers Petroleum’s operation in Albania, inherited a 
problematic situation, involving local resistance and an ongoing compliance investigation, 
which rapidly deteriorated as undesirable incidents related to fracking increased markedly 
(Tirana Times, 2017). This was perceived by local communities as evidence of intensifica-
tion in fracking, leading to a confrontation with GeoJade.
The concessionary rights to the oil field were acquired in 2004 by Bankers Petroleum. 
The company claims to be the “largest foreign direct investor, the largest tax payer (...), 
and one of the largest employers” in Albania (Bankers Petroleum Albania LTD Website, 
n.d.). In September 2016, GeoJade acquired Bankers for CAD 575 million, and took 
over extraction and further exploration of the largest onshore oilfield in Europe, Patos- 
Marinza (McCarthy Tétrault LLP, 2016). Fracking was first used by Bankers in 2008, 
with consequences being felt shortly thereafter. Villagers reported drinking and agricul-
tural water contamination as well as damage to their homes due to fracking- induced 
earthquakes (Portali i Energjise, 2017). According to the department of Seismology of 
the Institute of Geosciences, Energy, Water and Environment (IGJEUM), Polytechnic 
University of Tirana, during September to November 2016 there were more than 2,700 
earthquakes in Zharrëz – more than thirty a day (IGJEUM, 2017). The constant tremors 
caused house walls to crack, roofs to open and many villagers reported fearing for their 
lives. The company consistently denied any wrongdoing and was supported in this claim 
by a 2012 letter from the IGJEUM claiming that Zharrëz is a naturally highly seismic 
area (Lata, 2012) – the letter however never explained how it’s possible that it became 
so seismically active only after 2008. Villagers engaged in protest many times already 
before Bankers’ takeover by GeoJade, yet the company co- opted them by hiring the 
outspoken villagers or members of their family, or by renting their land. Thus, a fragile 
coexistence between economic needs and environmental concerns continued until 2016. 
A formal compliance investigation by CAO was instigated in 2013, which also involved 
the setting up of a dialogue group comprised of local community and Bankers represen-
tatives (Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, n.d.).
The situation however deteriorated after GeoJade acquired Bankers Petroleum, with 
intensified fracking operations causing major earthquakes on a daily basis. Shortly after the 
takeover, in 2017, a big explosion occurred in the area due to fracking, causing several 
earthquakes and provoking the anger of inhabitants ( Faxweb. al, 2017). In addition, commu-
nication between the local community and Bankers Petroleum ceased. GeoJade paid off a 
USD 55 m loan provided to Bankers by the IFC, so it was no longer obliged to participate 
in the CAO mediation process. Following months of inaction, GeoJade eventually agreed to 
re- engage with the CAO formal compliance process, which had by then lost momentum and 
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the faith of local community (Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, 2018). The villagers how-
ever continued to mobilise, asking for Hashtag Initiative’s assistance in December 2016. 
Their aim was to organise against the company and demand an end to fracking, as well as 
seek compensation for the damage already caused. Their action started with a week- long 
hunger strike, which was soon followed by a second one, as the government failed to inter-
vene as promised. In the meantime, related videos and news became viral on Albanian 
social media.
On the seventeenth day of the hunger strike, the villagers decided to escalate their protest. 
Their aim was to raise awareness and squat in front of the Ministry of Energy until three requests 
were met by the government: (1) fracking to be banned as a method with an executive order; (2) 
full compensation for the physical damages of the houses and (3) full rehabilitation of the envi-
ronment (Exit News, 2017). More than forty people from Zharrëz set off on foot towards Tirana, 
some 130 km to the north. As the group proceeded towards the capital, their plight was taken up 
by activists, public figures and academics who joined the march and raised awareness on social 
media. When the group reached Tirana, thousands of people joined them to show support. 
Following a four day sit- in at the Ministry of Infrastructure and Energy, the government offered 
a moratorium on fracking, full compensation for damaged property and opened a process of 
arbitration with Bankers Petroleum (Council of Ministers, Republic of Albania, 2017).
In summary, the Albanian case stands out in that the Chinese investor was a private entity 
rather than a state- owned one and its mode of entry was not through a bilateral negotiation 
with the Albanian government, during which the investor could shape the terms of the deal in 
its favour with the help of the Chinese state. In practice, this meant that the Chinese manage-
ment of Bankers Petroleum after September 2016 had to comply with the terms of operation 
in which it had no say in shaping. As the stalling of the mediation process following the 
acquisition of Bankers shows, the Chinese investor initially had neither the know- how nor 
the desire to address the controversies surrounding fracking on the site. When it increased 
fracking activity in the midst of mediation, it instantly undermined the World Bank- backed 
process, radicalising local protesters and civil society who managed to bring in the host 
state’s intervention on their favour in a relatively short period of time. This action showed a 
poor reading of the local political climate which ultimately led to a moratorium on fracking 
in the country. In other words, the Chinese private investor took over an already controversial 
project, intensified the conflict and failed to successfully lobby the Albanian government. 
Once public protest intensified and made support for Bankers politically unpalatable, the host 
state was quick to turn its back on the Chinese investor’s priorities. Ultimately, this case 
demonstrates the crucial importance of the point of entry. GeoJade missed the key advantage 
Chinese SOEs enjoyed in other countries: the Chinese state’s political leverage in the initial 
stages of negotiation and agreement. As GeoJade’s increased fracking challenged the context 
of operation agreed between the Albanian state and Bankers under the auspices of the IFC, it 
was confronted with significant resistance by local communities and the host state.
Bad Investors, Weak Hosts?
Conventional wisdom on Chinese capital in SEE presents investment- hungry host countries 
falling prey at the hands of inconsiderate and profit- maximising Chinese actors (Lagazzi 
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and Vít, 2017). This view ignores the fact that many of these projects were initiated by the 
host states and enjoyed the support of a dominant political group when they were approved. 
Yet it would be equally simplistic to say host state agency is all that matters. Going beyond 
the stage of inception, we have identified a more nuanced picture, which allows us to iden-
tify the factors explaining the poor performance of Chinese projects in terms of environ-
mental protection. First, the cases point to three key characteristics on the Chinese side that 
drive unsustainable practices in SEE projects: a lack of know- how, a financialised under-
standing of sustainability and a hands- off approach to ensuring compliance. Second, the role 
of host states in mediating these characteristics is problematic due to a lack of commitment 
in enforcing compliance with local and supranational regulatory frameworks, largely due to 
conflicting political priorities or insufficient state capacity. Third, the role of regional frame-
works is, at best, ambivalent, as although they provide a set of regulatory standards, they fail 
to promote compliance through enforcement or incentivisation of host states. This synergy 
of failures is crucial in the initial stages of negotiation and agreement, when the rules of 
interaction and the set of agreed expectations from each side emerges. At this phase, the 
socialisation of Chinese investors into environmental protection regulations, norms and best 
practices is ineffective, rendering subsequent governmental and/or societal efforts to enforce 
compliance a posteriori more difficult. A lack of sustainability can therefore appear to be 
“baked- in.”
The five Chinese companies exhibited little concern over the environmental impact of 
their operations from the outset of their involvement. Both in cases where an international 
tender took place (Greece) and those involving a bilateral agreement (Serbia, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, North Macedonia), the companies understood environmental impact as, pri-
marily, a bureaucratic requirement to be satisfied with the active support of “friendly” 
governments. This took the form of anaemic provisions on compliance in the agreements 
signed and the expectation that potential issues will be dealt with through coordination with 
host governments. As environmental protection became an issue of negotiation rather than 
compliance, all companies disregarded the necessity for comprehensive EIAs and pro-
ceeded with their operations largely uninterrupted from national authorities. In the cases 
where, following elections, new governments attempted to enforce compliance, this initial 
indifference resulted in significant delays and additional costs. COSCO, for instance, had to 
submit the Master Plan seven times since 2015 and its approval was still pending at the time 
of writing. In a similar vein, a second EIA for Kostolac had to be resubmitted in 2017 after 
the first one expired and was struck down in court, while the desulphurisation unit was 
declared operational despite never having received operating permits. In addition, Chinese 
investors exhibited the same indifferent attitude towards public consultation and in their 
communication with local communities both before and after environmental concerns were 
collectively raised by civil society. The mobilisation of local residents in Zharrëz and 
Piraeus, and of civil society regarding the Kostolac Power Plant and the Kičevo- Ohrid high-
way, was partly a response to the absence of engagement by the new investors.
The failure of host governments to provide a clear and stable regulatory environment that 
promotes compliance is the outcome of political expediency, rather than state capacity. In 
most cases examined, host governments welcomed Chinese investors and actively took 
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measures to create an “investment- friendly” environment through favourable terms in con-
tracts and laxity in compliance requirements. With motives ranging from attracting invest-
ment to outright corruption, host governments failed to socialise Chinese companies with 
their domestic regulatory environments and created a distorted set of expectations on “how 
things work” in their respective countries. Ultimately, this jeopardised the financial viability 
of projects and soured relations with local communities and civil society. The Greek gov-
ernment from 2008 to 2014 failed to engage COSCO in a way that promoted compliance, 
turning a blind eye on the problems created on the ground. As a result, after 2015, COSCO 
had neither the commitment nor the required expertise to address the requirements of an 
EIA. In the Kičevo- Ohrid highway, the EIA that the government of North Macedonia put in 
place had many irregularities which caused delays and increased costs. In Stanari, the 
Srpska government waived the requirement for an EIA despite the investor constructing a 
less efficient power plant originally agreed. In Kostolac, the Serbian side had to defend its 
involvement in the project with the Energy Community, which flagged it as a case of unde-
sirable state aid, yet without these sovereign loan guarantees, the project would not have 
been financed at all. Here too, the host state had assured the Chinese side that it was able to 
provide such guarantees.
Overall, the role of host states in shaping the environmental impact of a certain proj-
ect is crucial. A common trend we identified in the case of Greece, Serbia, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and North Macedonia, was that host governments attempted to lure Chinese 
companies by undermining compliance with existing regulatory frameworks instead of 
managing their expectations by being transparent on what compliance entails. In con-
trast, GeoJade did not negotiate with the Albanian state as part of the Bankers Petroleum 
takeover and, as a result, did not influence the business context of its investment. Instead, 
it inherited an already problematic situation involving tensions on the ground and an 
international investigation by CAO. As this pressure rendered support for the Chinese 
investor politically unattainable, the host state was more quick in intervening to protect 
local communities.
Considering the deficiencies in both investor and host state actors, regional regulatory 
frameworks are often the first port of call for civil society actors eager to contest environ-
mentally problematic projects. Yet the same frameworks also suffer from two crucial flaws. 
First, they often answer to conflicting normative priorities. Characteristically, in the case of 
Piraeus, EU pressure for the rapid privatisation of the port under the 2015 bail- out agree-
ment has curtailed the commitment of Greek authorities to enforce compliance. It has also 
created a peculiar situation where EU funding for the controversial Piraeus cruise terminal 
expansion, approved before the privatisation, is now in the hands of COSCO to the dismay 
of local residents. Second, among EU accession states, infrastructure upgrading is cited by 
local officials (Interview 2) as a key prerequisite of their countries’ entry into the EU, yet 
with European institutional lenders disbursing insufficient amounts, the promise of Chinese 
financing fits well into national developmental plans despite the potential frictions over the 
projects’ environmental repercussions. Regional institutions such as the Energy Community 
have proved powerless to prevent the adoption of projects with strong national backing and 
Chinese financing. Ultimately, such conflicting normative priorities have the effect of 
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undermining state capacity for intervention without building lasting tools for oversight and 
compliance.
Kostolac is a case in point, seeing how the coal power plant was challenged before the 
Energy Community on state aid rules, rather than environmental impact. Supporting energy 
market integration and competition rules, rather than opposing coal- power, was the more 
effective tactic for the ENGOs involved. But transnational regulatory frameworks are of 
limited effect when an enthusiastic host state is willing to provide the minimum required 
documentation post festum, as our cases demonstrated with varying degrees of administra-
tive irregularities. Ensuring compliance at the entry point is therefore a key method of pro-
moting environmentally sustainable investment and financing by Chinese actors in SEE. 
Yet, given the lack of transparency in early negotiations, the lack of know- how by investors 
and the unwillingness of host states to jeopardise politically important projects, societal 
contestation is often the very first hurdle some of the Chinese- financed projects face. The 
contested nature of the projects could indeed be taken as an indictment of the ineffective 
regulatory regimes present in the region – be they domestic or international.
Conclusion
This article has analysed five cases of large- scale projects across SEE by Chinese com-
panies that have raised environmental concerns. The aim of the research was to give a 
comparative account of how the specifics of incoming Chinese capital (state involve-
ment, lack of transparency, lack of societal engagement, lack of know- how on environ-
mental regulation and reliance on bilateral agreements in the place of compliance 
frameworks) intersect with the demands of sustainable development. To the wider ques-
tion whether Chinese capital brings practices that disregard environmental sustainability 
concerns, we offer a qualified “yes.” Qualified, because the problematic practices identi-
fied in our cases are only possible through the intentional or unintentional synergy of 
Chinese, local and regional actors. Our investigation leads us as far as to say that local 
state commitment to upholding sustainable practices is the key variable determining the 
extent to which Chinese capital creates downward pressures on environmental regula-
tions and norms. In relation to this, the role of regional organisations and regimes is 
crucial in strengthening the host governments’ often anaemic commitment to sustain-
ability. The EU accession process and the new foreign investment screening mechanism 
are instruments of particular importance in this regard and could be used to apply pres-
sure on candidate and member states, respectively, provided they are deployed at the 
right time and consistently. Due to the nature of Chinese financed projects and invest-
ments however, regional frameworks have been ineffectual either in shaping the deals or 
enforcing compliance at a later stage, highlighting the complicity of European institu-
tions in the resulting environmental degradation.
The lessons of this study have a comparative value that exceeds the context of Chinese 
capital in SEE. Much of the literature on transnational state- owned enterprises empha-
sises their relations with the state of origin to explain the form and impact of a project 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001; McNally, 2012; Nölke, 2014). The present article emphasises 
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the role of the host state as regulator and its commitment to sustainability as the key 
variable determining outcomes on the ground. Regional actors and frameworks need to 
concentrate on the direction of sustaining host states’ willingness and capacity to enforce 
compliance when faced with powerful state- backed investors, Chinese or otherwise. 
Regional environmental protection regimes and instruments can fill the void of regula-
tory gaps and can be used to prevent environmental damage (in the case of investment 
screening) or enforce compliance at a later stage. However, in order to understand the 
relationship between incoming capital and sustainability we need to bring the host state 
back in the equation. Explanations that portray states at the mercy of international inves-
tors, tend to deflect responsibility from host governments. Our findings point in the exact 
opposite direction, the existence of a synergy of actors that shape the sustainability of a 
project, whose failures can be unintentional as well as intended, but not inevitable.
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